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Research Article

Assessing the Operational Effectiveness of the Intelligence Cycle Within the Philippine Army Towards Insurgency

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ABSTRACT

This study aimed to evaluate the effectiveness of the intelligence cycle within the Philippine Army and identify associated risks and flaws. Specifically, it sought to determine the components of the intelligence cycle used by the Philippine Army such planning and programming, execution, and review and assessment. Moreover, it also determined the extent of effectiveness of these intelligence cycle components, the weaknesses and operational risks are associated with the current Intelligence Cycle Process, potentially compromising its effectiveness in gathering accurate and timely intelligence, and strategies and measures can be proposed to enhance the effectiveness and resilience of the Intelligence Cycle. It employed descriptive research design and employ survey questionnaires with a 5-point Likert scale. The study was conducted in the Area of responsibility of 7th Infantry Division, randomly selected 80 intelligence personnel from various ranks and roles. Data collection was methodical, ensuring validity and reliability through expert validation and pilot testing. In addition, it employed descriptive statistics and run through SPSS. The findings revealed that the Philippine Army strongly integrates intelligence findings into its planning, execution, and assessment phases, with high levels of agreement found in areas such as intelligence-driven mission planning (mean = 3.90), monitoring and adjusting operations based on real-time intelligence (mean = 3.99), and systematic review processes for intelligence operations (mean = 3.91), highlighting the Army's robust application of the intelligence cycle. The intelligence cycle components were rated as very effective in all phases, with planning (mean = 3.97), execution (mean = 3.97), and review and assessment (mean = 3.97) all receiving high ratings. These findings demonstrate that intelligence-driven planning and operations significantly enhance operational goals and mission success. However, weaknesses were identified, including a lack of specialized personnel (mean = 3.84), inconsistent intelligence analysis methodologies (mean = 3.08), and weak

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inter-unit intelligence sharing (mean = 3.09). Operational risks such as limited funding (mean = 3.90), logistical constraints (mean = 3.38), and poor coordination with other agencies (mean = 3.78) were also noted, which compromise the cycle's effectiveness. To address these challenges, strategies such as modernizing training, improving resource mobilization, and establishing a feedback mechanism for knowledge sharing were proposed. These measures aim to improve the intelligence cycle's effectiveness, with expected outcomes including better readiness through specialized training, improved mission success via coordinated deployment, and enhanced resource availability through partnerships. The research found that the Philippine Army effectively incorporates intelligence into planning and execution, improving unit readiness, flexibility, and mission performance. The intelligence loop improves planning, resource allocation, and operational execution, and real-time updates help units exploit threats and opportunities. The cycle's precision and reactivity are limited by resource constraints such inadequate workers, equipment, and funds. To improve the intelligence cycle's efficacy and resilience, invest in training, tools, infrastructure, feedback loops, and coordination.

Keywords: *Intelligence Cycle, Philippine Army, Insurgency, Philippines, Operational Effectiveness*

Background

Civilian oversight is essential for intelligence agencies in democratic regimes. This arises from the need for democratic openness and the secretive nature of intelligence work. Born and Leigh (2018) emphasize parliamentary supervision to balance intelligence operations' efficacy and democratic accountability, advocating for strong legislation to ensure intelligence services operate within legal boundaries.

Moreover, Southeast Asian advocates for intelligence transparency propose legislative measures to enhance transparency, arguing that openness improves democratic supervision and boosts intelligence agency credibility by building public confidence (Cruz & Magno, 2018). Conversely, Joya and Mendoza (2018) found that secrecy negatively impacts democracy in the Philippines, undermining public trust and civilian oversight, recommending a robust freedom of information framework.

The 21st-century battlefield demands a dynamic and efficient intelligence apparatus for military success. In the Philippine context, the Army (PA) faces internal security issues and territorial disputes, making a strong intelligence cycle vital (Cabrera, 2018).

Despite its importance, the PA's intelligence cycle's operational efficacy requires further research. Prior studies have focused on national security or intelligence gathering (Cabrera, 2018; Fastabend, 2017), with few examining the PA's intelligence cycle's efficiency.

Furthermore, Earley (2017) highlights the need for adequate training, resource allocation, and technology at each cycle phase. These elements are crucial for effective intelligence. Inadequate resources and training can hinder data collection and analysis. Furthermore, Smith and Jones (2020) recommend streamlining processes and enhancing inter-agency communication to reduce inefficiencies. Martinez (2020) advises using analytical tools and training to detect false data, enhancing digital intelligence.

Previous research highlights significant shortcomings in the PA's intelligence cycle. Bureaucratic inefficiencies and inter-agency rivalry impede decision-making and information flow (Stachel, 2016; Earley, 2017). The digital age increases vulnerability to misinformation (Grauer, 2017). Lajeunesse (2018) suggests

methods for source verification. Cabrera's (2020) Marawi siege report offers a framework to address these weaknesses.

Given shifting security risks, an agile intelligence cycle is necessary. This study analyzes the PA's current system to identify improvement areas, enhancing decision-making, operational efficiency, and national security. Internal security threats from insurgent groups and territorial disputes require a robust intelligence cycle. Understanding the PA's strengths and weaknesses will help address these challenges.

Hence, this study assessed the operational effectiveness of the intelligence cycle within the Philippine Army's operations. It also identified risks and flaws associated in the current process.

Literature Review

Intelligence Cycle

Hatlebrekke (2021) provides a definition of intelligence as the covert production of knowledge that is beyond the boundaries of logical thinking. This wisdom reduces uncertainty in estimations and so creates political, strategic, and operational advantages over opponents. In addition, it underscores that intelligence can only address the issue of induction to a limited extent. It can only mitigate the issue by reducing the uncertainty of uncertain estimations, hence lowering the amount of uncertainty. A common practice in intelligence is to oversee issues pertaining to the security of the state. One of the crucial responsibilities is to promptly inform important civilian, military, and political leaders about possible dangers, such as terrorism, cyberattacks, or the military capabilities of other nations (Stenslie et al., 2021).

Information and data on prospective threats are vital to intelligence. Risk and intelligence are clearly linked. Making predictions about an uncertain future is intelligence work. The goal is to direct future crime prevention measures. It uses incomplete current situation representations. Systematic management, dissemination, collection, and analysis of possible hazard data is another kind of intelligence. The thesis uses the same word for intelligence (Ylönen & Aven, 2023).

Components of Intelligence Cycle

Effective intelligence work necessitates the establishment of robust procedures. Prior to implementing the routines in a cycle, it is necessary to do a meticulous evaluation of the information requirements (Kristoffersen & Hatlebrekke, 2022). Irrespective of the specific domain of intelligence, every process always starts with the presence of at least one unresolved matter or unanswered query (Garner & McGlynn, 2018). According to Garner and McGlynn (2018), these challenges or questions are considered to be a need for measuring intelligence.

The activities that follow the intelligence need may be organized into a sequential process of obtaining, analyzing, and disseminating information. Intelligence work encompasses several aspects, and this process might potentially be expanded in the future (Kristoffersen & Hatlebrekke, 2022). In the field of intelligence, there exists a recognized cycle that is used for this specific aim. The process described is known as the intelligence cycle, which aims to convert information into intelligence and differentiate between several functional components, such as analysis and collecting (Grana & Windell, 2021; Stenslie et al., 2021). The intelligence cycle is a well-established structure that has undergone evolution and manifests in many ways depending on the user.

Planning and Programming

The process entails recognizing the need for intelligence and strategizing (Grana & Windell, 2021). The intelligence agency receives a request that requires gathering information and assists in determining how the outcome will be explained by prioritizing different intelligence requirements. Collecting and manufacturing tactics are also improving (Stenslie et al., 2021).

Execution

Data and issue information are collected in this stage (Stenslie et al., 2021; Grana & Windell, 2021). The analyst must comprehend why the work requires particular intelligence information and the precise queries being made to satisfy collection needs (Grana & Windell,

2021). All data and preceding data must be collected. Reviewing a broad array of reviews and data, including historical and present data, for relevance, significance, and accuracy is crucial (Grana & Windell, 2021).

Data from the collection into organized and usable formats for analysis. Data is condensed, structured, and analyzed for outputs. This involves turning data into actionable insights that can be shared. Some intelligence cycles include a step called 'Analysis' for information analysis. To simplify analysis, cases are grouped by relevance and significance (Grana & Windell, 2021, Stenslie et al., 2021).

Review and Assessment

The intelligence cycle is the methodical process of turning raw data and information into useful intelligence for an organization or nation. The intelligence cycle gathers and analyzes information on possible threats to an organization to determine their likelihood. The intelligence cycle involves collecting, processing, and using information to reduce risk.

Data were collected via humans, communications, images, and open-source intelligence. The planning and guiding process establishes intelligence collecting requirements. Data must be processed for accuracy, relevance, and reliability. Data is organized, translated, and formatted for analysis at this step. Analyzing processed data estimates intelligence. Analysts' trends, pattern, and hazard analysis helps decision-makers. The intelligence loop ends with military commanders and policymakers obtaining intelligence products. For decision-making, information should be timely and unambiguous (Sutea, 2019). Feedback, albeit not a phase, is crucial to the intelligence cycle. Assessing intelligence operations and using lessons learned improves future operations.

Effectiveness of Intelligence Cycle

National security and military activities depend on the Philippine Army's Intelligence Cycle. The Philippine Army collects, analyzes, and shares data via the Information Cycle (Arcala Hall, 2016). With informed decisions, senior leaders, combatant and joint force commanders, planners, and ground operators can win missions, engagements, and battles. AI Cycle predicts and prevents. Innovative technology lets the Philippine Army gather information quicker, better, and more effectively. Philippine Army Intelligence Cycle is discretely managed by Intelligence Community. The information Community must collaborate, expand access to timely information, reduce turf disputes and stove pipes, and partner with government, corporations, and local communities to achieve this goal. Situational awareness, skills, and national security may improve with IC.

Studies in select Panay islands show that the Philippine Army's Intelligence Cycle is hampered by restricted unconventional operations and uneven civilian pathways for project ideation, planning, and implementation (Arcala Hall, 2016). Philippine Army's Intelligence Cycle must strengthen national security and military operations. The Philippine Army's intelligence services must adapt to new technologies to tackle challenging challenges and stay ahead of threats in today's security environment.

Philippine National Army

The Philippine National Army (PNA) plays a crucial role in the country's security and intelligence system, dealing with many intricate difficulties and dangers. The Philippine National Army (PNA), which is entrusted with counterinsurgency operations, combats communist and Islamist factions, among others, that have historically presented substantial threats to internal security (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2021). Moreover, the PNA plays a crucial role in protecting the country's borders and dealing with the intricate challenges of maritime security, as well as transnational menaces including piracy, smuggling, and terrorism (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2021). Due to the Philippines' vulnerability to natural calamities, the Philippine News Agency (PNA) takes the lead in responding to and providing help during such catastrophes. The PNA dispatches workers to impacted regions to provide aid, ensure order, and support rehabilitation efforts (Philippine Information Agency, 2021).

The Philippine National Army also gathers intelligence from numerous sources for threat assessment and operations planning. Human,

communications, images, and open-source intelligence are included. The PNA works with other security agencies to stop extremist activities, destroy terrorist networks, and prevent attacks, highlighting its vital role in national security (CNN Philippines, 2021). In emergencies, the PNA assists civil authorities with law enforcement, infrastructure protection, and public safety (Philippine News Agency, 2021).

Several memoranda and executive orders have been imposed in recent years that support the backbone of the Philippine Army's strategy and operations against insurgency, integrating military efforts with broader socio-economic and political initiatives to achieve sustainable peace and security. The Executive Order No. 70 (2018) also known as the Whole of Nation Approach to End Local Communism which institutionalizes the "Whole-of-Nation Approach" in ending local communist armed conflict. It creates the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC). This approach aims to address the root causes of insurgency through a synchronized and integrated delivery of basic services and social development packages by the government. As assessed by Sumad-on (2021), The Philippine National Police, Armed Forces of the Philippines, and local government units have sustained their collaboration and efforts to combat terrorism by launching campaigns aimed at defeating all threat groups and criminal elements. They also maintain coordination with other law enforcement agencies to suppress terrorist groups. Additionally, community involvement, driven by the Barangay Local Government unit, plays a significant role in implementing Executive Order No. 70. They encourage residents to report any incidents related to NPA recruitment, operations, or propaganda to the nearest PNP or AFP station. While the overall results are positive, improvements are needed. The military should meet at least quarterly to ensure the ongoing delivery of services and the integration of policies, programs, projects, and activities into local plans based on the solutions identified by affected community members through the Barangay Local Government Unit.

Terrorism has been a significant threat in the Philippines for decades, with various groups perpetrating attacks across the country. Since the late 1960s, the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA) has been a persistent threat. The early 2000s saw the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) prompting an all-out war declaration by then-President Joseph Estrada. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) engaged in a brutal three-week siege in Zamboanga in 2013 due to perceived failures in a peace agreement. The May 2017 Marawi Siege was initiated by Jemaa Islamiyah and the Maute Group, both linked to ISIS. These attacks have heavily impacted civilians, causing loss of lives and extensive property damage. Terrorism continues to pose a severe threat, with recent incidents such as the CPP/NPA attack on aid distribution troops in April 2021 and the twin bombing in Jolo City in August 2020. The Philippines' main counterterrorism laws were previously the Human Security Act of 2007 and the Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act of 2012. Due to ongoing attacks, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 was quickly enacted, replacing the Human Security Act (Gonzales, 2020).

Challenges and Risks

The origins of the intelligence cycle may be attributed to the growth of intelligence systems during the Second World War. It has since been a fundamental component of worldwide training programs. Nevertheless, this situation has presented substantial difficulties for intelligence experts and personnel as they go from training to essential operations. Frequently, the real-life situations people face do not correspond with their predicted expectations. While it is acknowledged that the intelligence process may not always function as a cycle in reality, the intelligence cycle remains the prevailing paradigm for describing the intelligence process (Moen, 2020).

Due to the advent of quickly developing threats, it is frequently necessary to parallelize the typical linear sequence of collecting and processing procedures.

Intelligence work is conducted concurrently with increased adaptability and the capacity to bypass stages as needed in order to effectively address new risks (Stenslie et al., 2021). Put simply, the intelligence cycle no longer accurately represents the current state

of intelligence activity. Since the inception of intelligence and the subsequent evolution of the intelligence cycle, there have been developments and modifications that might potentially complicate the use of the conventional intelligence cycle.

Any examination of intelligence disasters reveals the same old problems coming round again and again. It is easy to see the main problems of intelligence; they tend, hardly unsurprisingly, to follow the intelligence cycle. More depressing is that many of the problems of incompetence did not come from the bowels of the intelligence organizations, but from the users (Hughes-Wilson, 2023).

Theoretical Framework

This study was anchored on Systems Theory by Lee A. Wilkinson (2011). Systems theory offers a strong framework for thoroughly evaluating the operational efficiency of the intelligence cycle in the Philippine Army. The intelligence cycle is a dynamic system of related acts, argues theory. Planning, collecting, processing, and sharing. This strategy improves situational awareness and decision-making. The intelligence cycle's numerous linkages and interdependencies must be coordinated and integrated to optimize outcomes. Systems theory may study how intelligence cycle phase variations affect system efficiency. Poor planning may affect collection resource allocation. Timely and accurate data processing and exchange will be affected. For continual evaluation and growth, systems theory promotes intelligence cycle feedback. The Philippine Army's intelligence system may become more resilient and flexible via feedback loop analysis. The intelligence loop and operational efficiency are explained by systems theory.

This enhances military intelligence and decision-making (Wilkinson, 2011). In this era of fast technological innovation and evolving security challenges, military organizations must prioritize intelligence to stay ahead and preserve national interests. National defense agency Philippine Army appreciates intelligence cycle. A systematic approach involves planning, collecting, analyzing, evaluating, and sharing information. Successful operations and informed decision-making need it.

Research Questions

This study aimed to assess the effectiveness of intelligence cycle on the operational of Philippine Army and to determine the risk and flaws associated within the current Intelligence Cycle Process.

Specifically, it sought to identify the following:

1. What are the specific components of the intelligence cycle utilized by the Philippine Army in terms of:
   1.1 Planning and Programming
   1.2 Execution
   1.3 Review and Assessment
2. What is the extent of effectiveness of these intelligence cycle components implemented by the Philippine Army?
3. What inherent flaws, weaknesses, and operational risks are associated with the current Intelligence Cycle Process, potentially compromising its effectiveness in gathering accurate and timely intelligence?
4. What strategies and measures can be proposed to enhance the effectiveness and resilience of the Intelligence Cycle Process within the Philippine Army?

Methods

This study utilized quantitative descriptive research. Quantitative descriptive research is a methodical and empirical strategy for collecting numerical data and producing statistics or information about a certain phenomenon. Data collection is the process of gathering numerical information to accurately define, summarize, and evaluate certain variables in a methodical and well-structured way (Frey, 2021).

Quantitative descriptive research can objectively analyze intelligence cycle performance parameters, making it ideal for this study. Quantitative approaches may assess and quantify specific components of the intelligence cycle utilized in terms of planning and direction, collection, processing, analysis and evaluation, and dissemination, determine the extent of effectiveness of these intelligence cycle components and the inherent flaws, weaknesses, and operational risks are associated with the current Intelligence Cycle Process, potentially compromising its effectiveness in gathering accurate and timely intelligence.

More so, quantitative descriptive study evaluated the Philippine Army's intelligence cycle operational efficiency methodically and rigorously. Researchers may collect, evaluate, and interpret performance measurements using quantitative approaches. This may give evidence-based insights into policy, training, and operational decisions. This boosts intelligence and national security.

Research Locale and Sampling Procedure

The research locale for this study was the Area of Responsibility (AOR) of the 7th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army. This area includes parts of Region 1, specifically Pangasinan, and Region 3, comprising Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac, and Zambales. These regions are crucial due to their numerous military facilities, intelligence units, and operational headquarters.

The study was primarily conducted at the Philippine Army's headquarters, intelligence units, and operational areas within these regions. To gain a comprehensive understanding of the intelligence cycle, access to various personnel, units, and operational situations was necessary.

To ensure reliable results, a specific procedure for sample selection was used, focusing on obtaining representative and trustworthy data. The study employed stratified random sampling to select battalion respondents in an impartial and representative manner. Participants were chosen randomly from different levels and roles within the intelligence cycle, including TRIAD Staff (S2), operations officers/training and education officers (S3), and Civil Military Operation (S7).

The roles of these officers were particularly relevant for the study. The TRIAD Staff (S2) are responsible for gathering, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence information, making them essential for understanding the effectiveness of intelligence operations and the challenges faced in data collection and analysis. operations officers/training and education officers (S3) oversee the planning, coordination, and execution of operations and training, providing crucial insights into how intelligence is integrated into operational planning and execution. Civil Military Operation (S7) plans and coordinates the management of disaster relief operation, military economic development, socio-economic development and environmental protection.

In the AOR of the 7th Infantry Division, 80 intelligence personnel were randomly sampled. This randomized process covered various positions within the intelligence cycle to provide a comprehensive view of the operations. By including these key officers and staff, the study aimed to capture a holistic perspective on the intelligence cycle's strengths, weaknesses, and areas for improvement.

Research Instruments

The research instruments for this study were primarily comprised of survey questionnaires meticulously crafted by the researcher to determine the effectiveness of intelligence cycle on the operational of Philippine Army and to determine the risk and flaws associated within the current Intelligence Cycle Process. The research instrument was self-made questionnaire align with the AFP or Philippine Army Standard Operating Procedure. A four-point Likert scale was used in surveys to assess respondents' complexity, efficacy, and operational dangers of Philippine Army intelligence cycle. This scale lets people express their ideas from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The validity and accuracy of these surveys were crucial. The survey was content validated by three highly known Philippine Army intelligence cycle process experts. Their insights helped improve questions and capture key concepts and aspects. Additionally, pilot testing was done to confirm instrument reliability. This step involved calculating Cronbach's alpha coefficients from a specified set of questionnaire respondents. The result of the pilot testing was acceptable. Hence, the researcher proceeded with the data gathering.

Data Gathering Procedures

This study collected reliable data on the efficacy of intelligence cycle on Philippine Army operations using a systematic approach. The approaches included numerous steps to ensure data accuracy, authenticity, and relevance. The researcher contacted the Officer-In-Charge of the Philippine Army Region 1 and 3 to get

permission to survey the group. A formal request was made to organization officials for permission and cooperation. Communication and involvement with the company are crucial for successful data collecting. After gaining permission, the researcher distributed survey questionnaires to 80 individuals. Intelligence officers, analysts, operators, and support workers were randomly selected. The respondents' convenience and preferences determined whether the questionnaire was delivered online or through pen and paper. The researcher provided brief orientation sessions and gave clear survey instructions to increase response rates and data quality. The sessions emphasized their participation, privacy, and influence on the study's outcomes.

Data Management and Analysis

Using different methods established for each questionnaire component, the results were thoroughly analyzed. The objective was to determine the effectiveness of intelligence cycle on Philippine Army operations and the risk and flaws of the current Intelligence Cycle Process.

Age, gender, years in service, and position were analyzed using frequency count and percentage descriptive statistics. These statistical metrics revealed the demographic distribution and makeup of respondents. The frequency count provided a precise numerical depiction of the individuals falling into each group, whilst percentages gave insights into the relative representation of respondents within each category.

The study focused on descriptive statistics using the mean to examine the Likert scale data related to the components, extent of effectiveness, and operational risks of intelligence cycle of Philippine Army. The mean scores used as a measure of central tendency, representing the average answer for each indicator. In addition, computing the standard deviation provided useful information about the spread or variation of answers from the average, so enriching the level of analysis.

Ethical Consideration

In adherence to the law protecting individuals' privacy on the Internet within the Intelligence Group of Philippine Army Region 1 and 3, this research first sought approval from the respondents before commencing the study. The research data will be kept secret and used just for this study. Before starting the questionnaire survey, respondents got an informative letter explaining the research's goal and scope. The questionnaire survey, a critical part of this research, only began when respondents provide express agreement, ensuring they understand the study's goals before responding. In accordance with privacy regulations, all responder data were treated carefully. The data are used just for this research and will not be shared, protecting participants' privacy. Respondent autonomy must be respected throughout the research. All questionnaire responders may exit at any moment. Survey responses may be deleted at any time. The research assessed respondents' responses even if they withdraw. Through the research, this ethical approach prioritizes respondents' rights and choices.

1. Results and Discussion

Specific Components of the Intelligence Cycle utilized by the Philippine Army.

Table 1. Specific Components of the Intelligence Cycle utilized by the Philippine Army (Planning and Programming)

Planning and Programming	Mean	Verbal Interpretation
The Army integrates intelligence findings into the development of plans and programs outlined in the CMO Support Plan, Program Objective Memorandum, and Annual Plans and Budget.	3.90	Strongly Agree

Planning and Programming	Mean	Verbal Interpretation
The Army-wide CMO Consultative Seminar-Workshop supports annual planning and programming for CMO programs, activities, and projects.	3.79	Strongly Agree
The Philippine Army uses mission planning based on the Unified Command Campaign Plan to enhance support planning and capabilities of Brigades and Battalions.	3.89	Strongly Agree
Philippine Army's general support status capacitate subordinate units to achieve CMO missions through tailored capability development and support.	3.51	Strongly Agree
Operational plans and programs at the Brigade, Battalion, and Company levels are developed to achieve CMO missions based on their specific functions and capabilities.	3.85	Strongly Agree
Overall Weighted Mean	3.79	Strongly Agree

Legend
3.25 - 4.00 Strongly Agree (Utilized at all times)
2.50 - 3.24 Agree (Most of the times)
1.75 - 2.49 Disagree (Sometimes)
1.00 - 1.74 Strongly Disagree (Not utilized at all times)

The respondent's assessment on the specific components of the intelligence cycle utilized by the Philippine Army in terms of planning and programming obtained an overall weighted mean of 3.79 (SD=0.20) which was verbally described as "strongly agree," or utilized at all times. It can be also seen that all of the indicators vouched strongly agree and equated as utilized all the times, these includes, the Army integrates intelligence findings into the development of plans and programs outlined in the CMO Support Plan, Program Objective Memorandum, and Annual Plans and Budget with mean score of 3.90, Operational plans and programs at the Brigade, Battalion, and Company levels are developed to achieve CMO missions based on their specific functions and capabilities with mean score of 3.85, the Philippine Army uses mission planning based on the Unified Command Campaign Plan to enhance support planning and capabilities of Brigades and Battalions with mean score of 3.89, The Army-wide CMO Consultative Seminar-Workshop supports annual planning and programming for CMO programs, activities, and projects with mean score of 3.79, and Philippine Army's general support status capacitate subordinate units to achieve CMO missions through tailored capability development and support with mean score of 3.51. More so, the item got the highest mean were "The Army integrates intelligence findings into the development of plans and programs outlined in the CMO Support Plan, Program Objective Memorandum, and Annual Plans and Budget" with a mean of 3.90 translated as "strongly agree," or "utilized at all times," and "The Philippine Army uses mission planning based on the Unified Command Campaign Plan to enhance support planning and capabilities of Brigades and Battalions" with a mean of 3.89 translated as "strongly agree," or "utilized at all times. While the item got the lowest mean was "Philippine Army's general support status capacitate subordinate units to achieve CMO missions through tailored capability development and support," with a mean of 3.51 which was verbally described as "strongly agree," or "utilized at all times." This result indicates that the Philippine Army strategically integrates information, although specialized assistance and resource distribution may be required to boost subordinate units' operational capabilities in attaining CMO goals.

Several infrastructural, training, and collaboration projects have improved the Philippine Army's intelligence capabilities. Collaborations like the DPWH "TIKAS" initiative, which builds intelligence infrastructure, have proven important. New Intelligence Cycle Operations

(ICO) training facilities provide improved instruction and support for officers and people. The Philippine Army requires this infrastructure to shelter and train personnel for changing security demands, notably in Mindanao and the South China Sea. In addition, the Civil-Military Operations (CMO) Regiment also involves the Multi-Sector Advisory Board (MSAB) in its efforts, enabling public-private collaborations that support a unified reform path (Armed Forces of the Philippines, 2022).

Mission planning based on overarching strategies, such as a Unified Command Campaign Plan, has also been identified as a key factor in enhancing organizational effectiveness. Taylor and Robinson (2019) emphasized that mission planning frameworks improve coordination and support at all levels of an organization, a finding that mirrors the Philippine Army's consistent focus on brigade and battalion-level capability development. DiNardo et al. (2021) recommend combining intelligence findings into strategic and operational planning to improve military operations. The Philippine Army's CMO Support Plan and Program Objective Memorandum integrate information, and intelligence-based planning guarantees real-time data and situational awareness drives decisions. Brigade and battalion operating plans must match their duties and capabilities to fulfill mission objectives. Garcia and Torres (2021) stress the need for military forums for information sharing and shared Civil-Military Operations. The Philippine Army is committed to enhancing CMO project planning and programming.

Table 2. Specific Components of the Intelligence Cycle utilized by the Philippine Army (Execution)

Execution	Mean	Verbal Interpretation
The HPA monitors and assesses the implementation of CMO support and sustainment provided to units.	3.79	Strongly Agree
The coordination and validation of Army unit deployment and employment by force employers are efficiently managed according to the units' functions and capabilities.	3.64	Strongly Agree
The programs and initiatives facilitated by the Army improve and enhance the operational effectiveness of Army units.	3.88	Strongly Agree
The Army ensures that the support and sustainment provided to units are aligned with their operational requirements and capabilities.	3.85	Strongly Agree
The Army's facilitation of CMO programs and initiatives leads to measurable improvements in the way Army units execute their missions.	3.88	Strongly Agree
Overall Weighted Mean	3.81	Strongly Agree

Legend
3.25 - 4.00 Strongly Agree (Utilized at all times)
2.50 - 3.24 Agree (Most of the times)
1.75 - 2.49 Disagree (Sometimes)
1.00 - 1.74 Strongly Disagree (Not utilized at all times)

The respondent's assessment on the specific components of the intelligence cycle utilized by the Philippine Army in terms of execution obtained an overall weighted mean of 3.81 (SD=0.21) which was verbally described as "strongly agree," or utilized at all times." The foregoing table revealed that all of the respondents vouched highest agreement which equated utilized all the times among the following indicators, "The Army's facilitation of CMO programs and initiatives leads to measurable improvements in the way Army units execute their missions" with mean score of 3.88, "The programs and initiatives facilitated by the Army improve and enhance the operational effectiveness of Army units" with

mean score of 3.88, “The Army ensures that the support and sustainment provided to units are aligned with their operational requirements and capabilities” with mean score of 3.85, “The HPA monitors and assesses the implementation of CMO support and sustainment provided to units” with mean score of 3.85, and “The coordination and validation of Army unit deployment and employment by force employers are efficiently managed according to the units' functions and capabilities” with mean score of 3.64. The items got the highest mean were " The programs and initiatives facilitated by the Army improve and enhance the operational effectiveness of Army units" and “The Army’s facilitation of CMO programs and initiatives leads to measurable improvements in the way Army units execute their missions” with a mean of 3.88 (SD=0.33) translated as "strongly agree," or “utilized at all times," while the item got the lowest mean was " The coordination and validation of Army unit deployment and employment by force employers are efficiently managed according to the units' functions and capabilities," with a mean of 3.63 which was verbally described as "strongly agree," or "utilized at all times." The results imply that increasing unit deployment coordination and validation may increase alignment with unit-specific capabilities and tasks because the army's review and evaluation operations improve unit effectiveness and mission execution.

The intelligence cycle—planning, direction, collecting, processing, analysis, production, and dissemination—improves military efficiency and effectiveness via strategic decision-making and action. This cycle helps the Philippine Army succeed by managing intelligence efforts and aligning them with operational requirements (Clarke & Knake, 2020). The Philippine Army's high intelligence cycle facilitation scores demonstrate best practices compliance, boosting mission performance. Intelligence-driven operational coordination improves unit deployment by using mission-specific resources and capabilities. Even though it has strengths, the Philippine Army's lowest-rated area—coordination and validation of unit deployment—shows room for improvement in aligning deployment efforts with unit capabilities that optimizing unit strengths can improve mission outcomes (Joya & Mendoza, 2018). Aslam and Raza (2020) said the military is using intelligence more and it shows that continuous intelligence system monitoring and assessment increase situational awareness and decision-making, helping the Philippine Army's CMO program execute missions. Estrada (2021) claims CMOs transform Philippine military operations. CMOs improve military-community engagement and mission performance, according to study. Salazar (2022) studies Philippine military intelligence development, concentrating on counterinsurgency methods and intelligence systems. The Philippine Army uses information to predict dangers and match CMO programs with security goals, according to the research. This supports your results that intelligence-backed CMO facilitation improves mission execution.

Table 3. Specific Components of the Intelligence Cycle utilized by the Philippine Army (Review and Assessment)

Review and Assessment	**Mean**	**Verbal Interpretation**
There is a systematic process in place for reviewing intelligence operations.	3.91	Strongly Agree
Feedback from the review process is used to improve future intelligence operations	3.84	Strongly Agree
The assessment phase identifies strengths and weaknesses in intelligence operations.	3.90	Strongly Agree
Lessons learned are documented and disseminated to relevant personnel	3.65	Strongly Agree
The review and assessment process are conducted regularly and consistently.	3.91	Strongly Agree
Overall Weighted Mean	3.84	Strongly Agree

Legend
3.25 - 4.00 Strongly Agree (Utilized at all times)
2.50 - 3.24 Agree (Most of the times)
1.75 - 2.49 Disagree (Sometimes)
1.00 - 1.74 Strongly Disagree (Not utilized at all times)

The respondents' assessment on the specific components of the intelligence cycle utilized by the Philippine Army in terms of review and assessment obtained an overall weighted mean of 3.84 which was verbally described as "strongly agree," or utilized at all times." It can be gleaned on the above-mentioned table that all of the indicators vouched highest agreement on the specific components of the intelligence cycle utilized by the Philippine Army which includes, "There is a systematic process in place for reviewing intelligence operations" with mean score of 3.91, "The review and assessment process are conducted regularly and consistently" with mean score of 3.91, "The assessment phase identifies strengths and weaknesses in intelligence operations" with mean score of 3.90, "Feedback from the review process is used to improve future intelligence operations" with mean score of 3.84, and "Lessons learned are documented and disseminated to relevant personnel" with mean score of 3.65. The item got the highest mean were " There is a systematic process in place for reviewing intelligence operations." and "The review and assessment process are conducted regularly and consistently," with a mean of 3.91 translated as "strongly agree," or "utilized at all times," and "The assessment phase identifies strengths and weaknesses in intelligence operations with a mean of 3.90 which was verbally described as "strongly agree," or "utilized at all times." While the item got the lowest mean was " Lessons learned are documented and disseminated to relevant personnel," with a mean of 3.65 which was verbally described as "strongly agree," or "utilized at all times.". The results imply that strong intelligence cycle execution by the Army, but sharing lessons gained may improve collective knowledge and operational agility.

In military operations, the intelligence cycle is crucial to effectiveness and flexibility in changing operating contexts. Research shows that a structured review procedure improves intelligence operations' consistency and quality. Routine assessments allow the intelligence cycle's execution stage to improve operations, optimize resources, and quickly rectify intelligence shortfalls. Such evaluations are crucial for armed units like the Philippine Army to maintain an effective and strategic intelligence infrastructure (Floyd, 2021). Thompson and Lee (2020) stated that timely sharing of lessons learned is essential for fostering a learning organization and improving operational agility. The Army's relatively lower score in this area suggests that while intelligence operations are well-executed, improvements in documenting and disseminating lessons could enhance collective knowledge and overall mission effectiveness. The Army's systematic reviews coincide with military studies stressing feedback and evaluation procedures for operational performance. Recent research shows that military intelligence cycles need frequent evaluations to inform strategic and tactical choices (Santos & Lim, 2020). According to Ramos (2021), constant assessment increases operational preparedness and strategic modifications during operations, as seen in the Philippine Army's operational framework. The Philippine Army's intelligence cycle is well-executed, but sharing and documenting lessons learned will strengthen its collective knowledge and operational effectiveness, supporting its transformation goals and fostering continuous improvement.

2. *Extent of Effectiveness of these Intelligence Cycle Components implemented by the Philippine Army.*

Table 4 Extent of Effectiveness of these Intelligence Cycle Components implemented by the Philipine Army (Planning and Programming)

Planning and Programming	Mean	Verbal Interpretation
The extent to which the Philippine Army effectively integrates intelligence findings into the development of strategic and operational plans is substantial.	3.96	Very Effective
The effectiveness of the Army's planning processes in being informed by intelligence data, resulting in comprehensive and actionable programs, is significant.	3.96	Very Effective
The extent to which intelligence inputs are utilized to shape the Army's budget and resource allocation during the programming phase is considerable.	3.98	Very Effective
The effectiveness of the Army's strategic and operational plans in addressing identified intelligence threats and opportunities is high.	3.99	Very Effective
The extent to which intelligence-driven planning ensures the alignment of the Army's programs and initiatives with long-term strategic objectives is large.	3.96	Very Effective
Overall Weighted Mean	3.97	Very Effective

Legend
3.25 - 4.00 Very Effective (To a very great extent)
2.50 - 3.24 Effective (Great Extent)
1.75 - 2.49 Slightly Effective (Slight extent)
1.00 - 1.74 Not Effective (To no extent)

The table above presents the respondent's assessment on the extent of effectiveness of these intelligence cycle components implemented by the Philippine army in terms of planning and programming gained an overall weighted mean of 3.97 (SD=0.16) which was verbally described as "Very Effective," or "To a very great extent." It can be seen on the table above that all of the indicators vouched very effective in the implementation of specific components these includes, "The effectiveness of the Army's strategic and operational plans in addressing identified intelligence threats and opportunities is high" with mean score of 3.99, "The extent to which intelligence inputs are utilized to shape the Army's budget and resource allocation during the programming phase is considerable" with mean score of 3.98, "The extent to which the Philippine Army effectively integrates intelligence findings into the development of strategic and operational plans is substantial", "The effectiveness of the Army's planning processes in being informed by intelligence data, resulting in comprehensive and actionable programs, is significant", and "The extent to which intelligence-driven planning ensures the alignment of the Army's programs and initiatives with long-term strategic objectives is large" with mean score of 3.96. The item got the highest mean was " The effectiveness of the Army's strategic and operational plans in addressing identified intelligence threats and opportunities is high," with a mean of 3.99 translated as "very effective," or "To a very great extent," while the item got the lowest mean were " The extent to which the Philippine Army effectively integrates intelligence findings into the development of strategic and operational plans is substantial", "The effectiveness of the Army's planning processes in being informed by intelligence data, resulting in comprehensive and actionable programs, is significant" and "The extent to which intelligence-driven planning ensures the alignment of the

Army's programs and initiatives with long-term strategic objectives is large," with a mean of 3.96 which was verbally described as "Very Effective," or "To a very great extent." The findings indicate that information informs the Army's planning and programming, allowing responsive and aligned strategic goals. Integrating and aligning intelligence data across all planning phases may improve efficacy.

Evidence from various personnel roles within the Army supports the consistent application of intelligence throughout the planning cycle. Information from Army personnel positions aids intelligence use throughout the planning cycle. In the field or office, the CI NCO and Assistant CI NCO acquire and synthesize information to guide operational choices. These intelligence gathering responsibilities guarantee that information inputs are correctly transformed into executable strategies. Team Leaders, Assistant Team Leaders, and Intel Officers connect operational plans with the Army's strategic goals by integrating intelligence findings. These strategic and tactical leaders oversee intelligence collection and integration into long-term operational objectives. By using analytical and investigative methods to evaluate intelligence data, Analysts, Investigators, and Operations NCOs strengthen the intelligence cycle. Cross-functional coordination between these positions ensures intelligence outputs meet changing operational and strategic demands. Office-based staff including Admin NCOs, Clerks, and GIS NCOs ensure intelligence data is correctly recorded, preserved, and mapped for future planning. This office support keeps information accessible and actionable for future development stages. Drone Operators and Operatives in the field deliver real-time information that informs the Army's urgent operational choices, aligning intelligence-driven tactics with on-the-ground reality. These intelligence components are routinely implemented across organizational levels, demonstrating the Army's methodical integration of intelligence data in all planning and programming stages. To respond to threats and opportunities, the Philippine Army gathers, analyzes, and refines operational and strategic plans using intelligence. The Army's consistent use of intelligence in field and office responsibilities shows its dedication to data-driven decision-making and its influence on strategic direction.

Effective military intelligence cycle planning and programming ensures intelligence returns support strategic and operational goals and respond to changing threats and opportunities. Research suggests that using information in all planning stages helps military organizations adapt to changing conditions. Higher strategic and operational plan success ratings for the Philippine Army indicate intelligence-driven processes, complementing recent studies on intelligence in comprehensive, goal-oriented planning (Clarke & Knake, 2020).

Table 5. Extent of Effectiveness of these Intelligence Cycle Components implemented by the Philippine Army (Execution)

Execution	Mean	Verbal Interpretation
The extent to which the Philippine Army effectively implements plans and programs based on intelligence assessments to achieve operational goals is significant.	3.96	Very Effective
The effectiveness of intelligence in guiding the deployment and employment of Army units during operational execution is considerable.	3.98	Very Effective
The extent to which intelligence-driven operations are coordinated and validated to ensure mission success is high.	3.95	Very Effective
The effectiveness of the Philippine Army in monitoring and adjusting ongoing operations based on real-time intelligence updates is substantial.	3.99	Very Effective

Execution	Mean	Verbal Interpretation
The extent to which the execution of CMO programs is supported by intelligence to address evolving threats and operational challenges is significant.	3.99	Very Effective
Overall Weighted Mean	3.97	Very Effective

Legend
3.25 - 4.00 Very Effective (To a very great extent)
2.50 - 3.24 Effective (Great Extent)
1.75 - 2.49 Slightly Effective (Slight extent)
1.00 - 1.74 Not Effective (To no extent)

As shown in the table presents the respondent's assessment on the extent of effectiveness of these intelligence cycle components implemented by the Philippine army in terms of execution gained an overall weighted mean of 3.97 which was verbally described as "very effective," or to a very great extent." It can be seen on the table above that all of the indicators vouched very effective in the implementation of specific components these includes, "The effectiveness of the Philippine Army in monitoring and adjusting ongoing operations based on real-time intelligence updates is substantial" and "The extent to which the execution of CMO programs is supported by intelligence to address evolving threats and operational challenges is significant" vouched mean score of 3.99, "The effectiveness of intelligence in guiding the deployment and employment of Army units during operational execution is considerable" with mean score of 3.98, "The extent to which the Philippine Army effectively implements plans and programs based on intelligence assessments to achieve operational goals is significant" with mean score of 3.96, and "The extent to which intelligence-driven operations are coordinated and validated to ensure mission success is high" with mean score of 3.95. The item got the highest mean were "The effectiveness of the Philippine Army in monitoring and adjusting ongoing operations based on real-time intelligence updates is substantial" and "The extent to which the execution of CMO programs is supported by intelligence to address evolving threats and operational challenges is significant," with a mean of 3.99 translated as "very effective," or "To a very great extent," while the item got the lowest mean was " The extent to which intelligence-driven operations are coordinated and validated to ensure mission success is high," with a mean of 3.95 which was verbally described as "Very Effective," or "To a very great extent." Hence, the findings indicate that the Philippine Army seems to employ intelligence to better operational execution, particularly under shifting situations. Improved coordination and validation might ensure mission success across all units.

Real-time intelligence updates and Civil-Military Operations (CMO) program assistance are the Philippine Army's highest mean scores of 3.99, demonstrating its dedication to integrating intelligence into all levels of operations. Numerous Army personnel jobs demonstrate the continual use of intelligence throughout execution. Whether in the field or office, the CI NCO and Assistant CI NCO acquire and synthesize information that guides operational choices. These jobs effectively transform intelligence inputs into actionable strategies for quick and informed operational modifications. Team Leaders, Assistant Team Leaders, and Intel Officers incorporate intelligence findings into operational plans to ensure alignment with strategic objectives. These tactical and strategic leaders oversee intelligence gathering and integration into immediate and long-term operational plans. Analysts, Investigators, and Operations NCOs analyze and review intelligence data using analytical and investigative capabilities to boost the intelligence cycle. This cross-functional cooperation keeps intelligence current with operational and strategic demands. Office-based staff including Admin NCOs, Clerks, and GIS NCOs ensure intelligence data is properly recorded, preserved, and mapped for future use. This office assistance ensures that intelligence is actionable now and

for future planning. Drone operators and field operators deliver real-time information, affecting operational choices and aligning intelligence-driven tactics with on-the-ground reality. These intelligence components are consistently implemented across organizational levels, demonstrating the Army's methodical integration of information into planning, programming, and execution. The Philippine Army adapts to threats and opportunities by gathering, analyzing, and using intelligence to develop operational and strategic plans. In the field and in office, the Army uses intelligence consistently, demonstrating its dedication to data-driven decision-making and the importance of information in setting its strategic direction.

For the purpose of making informed decisions and maintaining operational agility in settings that are constantly changing, it is vital to gather, process, analyze, disseminate, and provide feedback on intelligence. According to Lowry (2020), an intelligence cycle that is well-functioning may boost operational performance by delivering information that is both timely and relevant inside the organization. Moreover, it underlines the need of military organizations adapting their operations by using the intelligence cycle. A military that is able to update information in real time gives it agility. Data-driven forces that operate in real time perform better. According to Smith et al. (2023), monitoring and adjustment techniques are beneficial to the success of missions because they enable operators to rapidly change to ever-changing dangers.

Collecting, processing, analyzing, disseminating, and providing feedback on intelligence are all very important for making informed decisions and maintaining operational agility in circumstances that are always changing. According to Lowry (2020), an intelligence cycle that is well-functioning may boost operational performance by delivering information that is both timely and relevant inside the organization. In addition to this, it underlines the need of transitioning military organizations to use the intelligence cycle. Military agility is enhanced by information updates that occur in real time. Data-driven forces that operate in real time perform better. By enabling operators to rapidly alter their strategies in response to emerging dangers, monitoring and adjustment procedures contribute to the success of missions (Smith et al., 2023).

Table 6. Extent of Effectiveness of these Intelligence Cycle Components implemented by the Philippine Army (Review and Assessment)

Review and Assessment	**Mean**	**Verbal Interpretation**
The extent to which the Headquarters Philippine Army effectively conducts performance reviews to evaluate the success of intelligence operations and their impact on achieving objectives is considerable.	3.95	Very Effective
The effectiveness of Quarterly Strategy Reviews in assessing the integration and performance of intelligence in the Army's strategic planning is significant.	3.96	Very Effective
The extent to which Program Performance and Budget Execution Reviews measure the efficiency of intelligence-driven resource allocation and program implementation is substantial.	3.96	Very Effective
The effectiveness of the Army-wide CMO Annual Review in evaluating the overall performance and impact of CMO programs and intelligence initiatives is high.	3.99	Very Effective
The extent to which the Headquarters Philippine Army conducts performance reviews to evaluate the success of intelligence operations and their impact on achieving objectives is large.	3.98	Very Effective
Overall Weighted Mean	3.97	Very Effective

Legend
3.25 - 4.00 Very Effective (To a very great extent)
2.50 - 3.24 Effective (Great Extent)
1.75 - 2.49 Slightly Effective (Slight extent)
1.00 - 1.74 Not Effective (To no extent)

The table presents the respondent's assessment on the extent of effectiveness of these intelligence cycle components implemented by the Philippine army in terms of review and assessment gained an overall weighted mean of 3.97 which was verbally described as "very effective," or "To a very great extent." It can be seen on the table above that all of the indicators vouched very effective in the implementation of specific components these includes, "The effectiveness of the Army-wide CMO Annual Review in evaluating the overall performance and impact of CMO programs and intelligence initiatives is high" with mean score of 3.99, "The extent to which the Headquarters Philippine Army conducts performance reviews to evaluate the success of intelligence operations and their impact on achieving objectives is large" with mean score of 3.98, "The effectiveness of Quarterly Strategy Reviews in assessing the integration and performance of intelligence in the Army's strategic planning is significant" with mean score of 3.96, "The extent to which Program Performance and Budget Execution Reviews measure the efficiency of intelligence-driven resource allocation and program implementation is substantial" with mean score of 3.96, and "The extent to which the Headquarters Philippine Army effectively conducts performance reviews to evaluate the success of intelligence operations and their impact on achieving objectives is considerable" with mean score of 3.95. The items got the highest mean were "The effectiveness of the Army-wide CMO Annual Review in evaluating the overall performance and impact of CMO programs and intelligence initiatives is high," with a mean of 3.99 translated as "Very effective," or "To a very great extent," "The extent to which the Headquarters Philippine Army conducts performance reviews to evaluate the success of intelligence operations and their impact on achieving objectives is large" with a mean of 3.98 translated as "Very effective," or "To a very great extent." While the item got the lowest mean was "The extent to which the Headquarters Philippine Army effectively conducts performance reviews to evaluate the success of intelligence operations and their impact on achieving objectives is considerable," with a mean of 3.95 which was verbally described as "Very effective," or "To a very great extent." The results reveal the Army's review and assessment mechanisms substantially support intelligence and CMO program evaluation and effect. Unit-wide performance evaluation consistency may enhance evaluations and align them with the Army's strategic objectives.

Based on the interviews conducted, the two highest mean scores reflect the successful implementation of the Army-wide Civil-Military Operations (CMO) Annual Review and Headquarters Performance Reviews of Intelligence Operations. Respondents from various roles, including I NCO, Assistant CI NCO, Team Leader, Assistant Team Leader, Admin NCO, Analyst NCO, Assistant Investigator, Clerk, Drone Operator, Intel NCO, Intel Officer, Investigator, Operation NCO, Operative, Platoon Sgt, Production NCO, and GIS NCO, provided evidence highlighting the efficacy of these reviews. They emphasized that annual performance reports serve as key indicators of success, demonstrating improvements in civilian trust, conflict reduction, and enhanced community interactions, especially in insurgency-prone regions. Coordination papers such as Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) and unit comments were cited as tangible evidence of how intelligence efforts support CMO goals. These reports, alongside real-time field data, capacity-building, and training, were identified as critical factors in aligning intelligence operations with military objectives. Furthermore, regular assessments, including the Philippine Army's Programs Review, Annual General Inspections, and Quarterly Assessments conducted by the 7th Infantry Division (7ID), were

highlighted as crucial for maintaining operational effectiveness. The Division Intelligence Operation Review and Evaluation Board (DIOREB) rewards high-performing personnel based on their contributions to intelligence operations, underscoring the importance of regular reviews in refining and improving intelligence practices across all levels of the force. The frequency of these reviews and assessments is consistent and well-established, with annual, quarterly, and periodic evaluations ensuring continuous monitoring and improvement of intelligence operations at both the unit and organizational levels.

When assessing the efficiency of CMO programs and intelligence activities, the Army-wide CMO Annual Review is identified as an important component that should be considered. According to the findings of research conducted by Green and Johnson (2021), conducting performance evaluations on a regular basis provides crucial input that can be used to guide future operational initiatives. They contend that such assessments are essential in order to comprehend the manner in which intelligence operations assist to the accomplishment of missions and improve the overall effectiveness of military programs.

Performance assessments may be improved by conducting them equally across all units and aligning them with strategic goals. The research suggests that strengthening unit-wide performance assessments might improve mission results and fit with the Army's long-term aims (Roberts, 2019). According to Smith et al. (2021), frequent performance assessments in military intelligence give crucial insights into operation success, ensuring military goals are attained. The Philippine Army's performance assessments, including the Army-wide CMO Annual Review, support this. Regular reviews improve intelligence resource allocation and decision-making. Quarterly performance reviews help integrate intelligence operations into strategic frameworks and ensure mission success (Smith et al., 2023). Martinez and Santos (2022) examined how budget execution reviews and performance assessments enhance intelligence program resource allocation, improving military operations. It further said that such evaluations are crucial for analyzing intelligence operations' cost-effectiveness and allocating resources effectively to meet military goals.

3. Weaknesses, and Operational Risks That are Associated with the Current Intelligence Cycle Process, Potentially Compromising Its Effectiveness in Gathering Accurate and Timely Intelligence

Table 7. Weaknesses, And Operational Risks That Are Associated With The Current Intelligence Cycle Process, Potentially Compromising Its Effectiveness In Gathering Accurate And Timely Intelligence (Weaknesses)

Weaknesses	Mean	Verbal Interpretation
The intelligence cycle often lacks sufficient personnel with specialized skills to handle complex intelligence requirements effectively.	3.84	Strongly Agree
The intelligence analysis phase lacks a standardized methodology, resulting in inconsistencies in the quality of intelligence products.	3.08	Agree
Current intelligence-sharing mechanisms between different units or agencies are weak, leading to information silos and ineffective collaboration.	3.09	Agree
There is insufficient investment in advanced technology, which weakens the intelligence cycle's ability to process real-time data.	1.98	Disagree

Weaknesses	Mean	Verbal Interpretation
The feedback loop in the intelligence cycle is underdeveloped, limiting the capacity to learn from previous mistakes and improve future operations.	1.70	Strongly Disagree
Overall Weighted Mean	2.74	Agree

Legend
3.25 - 4.00 Strongly Agree (Very much a problem)
2.50 - 3.24 Agree (Much as problem)
1.75 - 2.49 Disagree (Not a problem)
1.00 - 1.74 Strongly Disagree (Not a problem at all)

The table above presents the respondent's assessment on the weaknesses, and operational risks that are associated with the current intelligence cycle process, potentially compromising its effectiveness in gathering accurate and timely intelligence in terms of weaknesses obtained an overall weighted mean of 2.74 which was verbally described as "agree," or "much a problem." It can be gleaned that "The intelligence cycle often lacks sufficient personnel with specialized skills to handle complex intelligence requirements effectively" with mean score of 3.84 and equated as very much a problem, "Current intelligence-sharing mechanisms between different units or agencies are weak, leading to information silos and ineffective collaboration" with 3.09 and " The intelligence analysis phase lacks a standardized methodology, resulting in inconsistencies in the quality of intelligence products" with 3.08 mean score vouched much a problem. On the other hand, "The feedback loop in the intelligence cycle is underdeveloped, limiting the capacity to learn from previous mistakes and improve future operations" with mean score of 1.70 vouched not a problem at all while "There is insufficient investment in advanced technology, which weakens the intelligence cycle's ability to process real-time data" with mean score of 1.98 vouched not a problem. The item got the highest mean was "The intelligence cycle often lacks sufficient personnel with specialized skills to handle complex intelligence requirements effectively," with a mean of 3.83 translated as "strongly agree," or "very much a problem," while the item got the lowest mean was "The feedback loop in the intelligence cycle is underdeveloped, limiting the capacity to learn from previous mistakes and improve future operations," with a mean of 1.70 which was verbally described as "strongly disagree," or "not a problem at all." The findings suggest that although human capabilities may challenge the intelligence cycle, respondents are not concerned about the feedback loop. Specialized skills may increase the intelligence cycle and operational efficiency.

Effective intelligence operations need training and skill, according to literature. Johnson et al. (2020) says undertrained intelligence analysts misinterpret complex threats, resulting in inefficient intelligence output. They suggest specialized training may enhance intelligence personnel's abilities and operations. Ylonen and Aven (2023) discovered that intelligence operations using feedback mechanisms were more adaptable and resilient. Davis believes that process enhancement requires learning from past experiences. Thompson (2021) found that fragmented intelligence-sharing techniques create information silos, limiting intelligence cycle efficacy. Effective agency coordination is necessary for timely and accurate intelligence sharing. Inter-agency communication issues hinder coordinated efforts, resulting in lost counter-intelligence possibilities. According to Becker and Lawrence (2021), the lack of established methods in intelligence analysis may result in inconsistent and inaccurate intelligence products, which harms operational decision-making. Unified intelligence analysis methods are essential for systematic and consistent evaluation.

Table 8. Weaknesses, And Operational Risks That Are Associated With The Current Intelligence Cycle Process, Potentially Compromising Its Effectiveness In Gathering Accurate And Timely Intelligence (Procedure)

Procedure	Mean	Verbal Interpretation
Operational risks such as limited funding and inadequate resources frequently hinder the effectiveness of intelligence gathering and analysis.	3.90	Strongly Agree
The intelligence cycle is often disrupted by high personnel turnover, affecting continuity and operational readiness.	3.23	Agree
Logistical constraints, such as lack of access to real-time data in remote or hostile environments, pose significant operational risks.	3.38	Strongly Agree
The lack of standardized training across intelligence personnel increases the risk of inconsistent execution of intelligence tasks.	3.73	Strongly Agree
Poor coordination with other military or law enforcement agencies during intelligence operations creates operational bottlenecks that reduce effectiveness.	3.78	Strongly Agree
Overall Weighted Mean	3.60	Strongly Agree

Legend
3.25 - 4.00 Strongly Agree (Very much a problem)
2.50 - 3.24 Agree (Much as problem)
1.75 - 2.49 Disagree (Not a problem)
1.00 - 1.74 Strongly Disagree (Not a problem at all)

The table above presents the respondent's assessment on the weaknesses, and operational risks that are associated with the current intelligence cycle process, potentially compromising its effectiveness in gathering accurate and timely intelligence in terms of procedures obtained an overall weighted mean of 3.60 which was verbally described as "strongly agree," or "very much a problem." The following items vouched very much a problem, "Operational risks such as limited funding and inadequate resources frequently hinder the effectiveness of intelligence gathering and analysis" with mean score of 3.90, "Poor coordination with other military or law enforcement agencies during intelligence operations creates operational bottlenecks that reduce effectiveness" with mean score of 3.78, "The lack of standardized training across intelligence personnel increases the risk of inconsistent execution of intelligence tasks" with mean score of 3.73, and "Logistical constraints, such as lack of access to real-time data in remote or hostile environments, pose significant operational risks" with mean score of 3.38 while "The intelligence cycle is often disrupted by high personnel turnover, affecting continuity and operational readiness" with mean score of 3.23 vouched much a problem. The item got the highest mean was "Operational risks such as limited funding and inadequate resources frequently hinder the effectiveness of intelligence gathering and analysis," with a mean of 3.90 translated as "strongly agree," or "very much a problem," and "Poor coordination with other military or law enforcement agencies during intelligence operations creates operational bottlenecks that reduce effectiveness" with a mean of 3.90 translated as "strongly agree," or "very much a problem." While the item got the lowest mean was "The intelligence cycle is often disrupted by high personnel turnover, affecting continuity and operational readiness," with a mean of 3.23 which was verbally described as "agree," or "much a problem at all." The findings imply that budget and resource limits are the biggest intelligence cycle procedural obstacles, whereas personnel turnover is less critical. Reduced budget constraints may enhance Army

intelligence collection and analysis, boosting operational preparedness and continuity.

Key conclusions suggest that operational issues like limited finances and resources hinder intelligence effectiveness. According to the literature, intelligence operations need enough funding and resources. It believes insufficient funding inhibits intelligence agencies from investing in key technology and personnel, diminishing operational effectiveness. They say resource limitations may hinder information collecting and analysis (Ylonen & Aven, 2023). Walker (2020) found that succession planning and training may offset the effects of staff turnover on intelligence operations. Jones and Wang (2020) report that operational resources typically fall short of intelligence operations' rising needs, compromising technology acquisition, people training, and data processing. It further claims that intelligence units lack resources to maintain operational preparedness and acquire credible data, resulting in intelligence coverage gaps. Smith and Lopez (2019) discovered that intelligence agencies' failure to communicate timely and relevant information causes operational inefficiencies and lost decision-making chances. Lack of coordinated agency communication networks hinders activities, affecting national security.

4. Strategies and Measures can be proposed to enhance the effectiveness and resilience of the Intelligence Cycle Process within the Philippine Army

Numerous ways to enhance the Philippine Army's Intelligence Cycle Process may be suggested based on critical findings concerning its components, effectiveness, and limits.

Title	Description	Duration	Expected Outcomes
Modernization and Training Initiative	Conduct specialized training workshops on intelligence gathering, analysis, and emerging technologies	Quarterly sessions for one year	Improved readiness and proficiency in using modern intelligence tools and technologies.
Deployment Coordination System	Establish a centralized coordination hub to oversee deployment strategies and validate operational alignment with unit capabilities.	Year Round	Improved mission success and resource allocation.
Feedback and Knowledge Sharing Mechanism	Introduce a formalized system for documenting and sharing lessons learned from previous operations. Conduct annual workshops to disseminate best practices.	Quarterly	Enhanced agility and adaptability through shared experiences and best practices.
Resource Mobilization and Partnership Program	Secure additional funding and resources by partnering with government agencies, NGOs, and private organizations.	Semi-annually	Enhanced resource availability, strengthened partnerships, and improved funding capabilities to sustain critical intelligence operations.
Retention and Professional Growth Plan	Offer career development pathways, including promotions, advanced education opportunities, and	Year Round	Enhanced staff satisfaction and retention rates.

Title	Description	Duration	Expected Outcomes
	improved living conditions for intelligence personnel.		
Evaluation and Performance Monitoring System	Develop a digital dashboard to monitor and evaluate the efficiency of intelligence operations.	Year round	Real-time performance insights, bottleneck identification, and data-driven decision-making to optimize intelligence operations.

Conclusion

The intelligence cycle components utilized by the Philippine Army include successful integration into planning and programming through the CMO Support Plan, Program Objective Memorandum, and Annual Plans, aligning with strategic goals. In execution, intelligence enhances unit readiness and adaptability, particularly for Civil-Military Operations (CMO) initiatives. Regular performance evaluations ensure intelligence operations remain current and actionable, improving coordination, validation efforts, and overall mission effectiveness. The intelligence cycle demonstrates significant effectiveness in improving planning, resource allocation, and operational execution. Real-time updates and adaptability enable units to address hazards and seize opportunities effectively. The intelligence cycle faces inherent flaws, weaknesses, and operational risks due to resource constraints, including limited financial resources, a lack of personnel trained in intelligence operations, and insufficient tools for data collection, processing, and dissemination. These limitations pose significant operational risks, affecting the accuracy, timeliness, and responsiveness of the intelligence cycle, potentially compromising its overall effectiveness. Despite the current effectiveness of the intelligence process, there is a need to propose strategies to address identified weaknesses. These include allocating resources for training, tools, and infrastructure; strengthening feedback loops and adaptive learning to enhance flexibility; promoting the sharing of lessons learned across units for continuous improvement; and focusing on unit-specific coordination to improve mission alignment and success. These measures will ultimately enhance the overall effectiveness and resilience of the intelligence cycle.

Recommendations

Intelligence Cycle Components and Effectiveness. The Philippine Army has successfully integrated intelligence into planning and programming through the CMO Support Plan, Program Objective Memorandum, and Annual Plans, aligning with strategic goals. In execution, intelligence significantly enhances unit readiness and adaptability, particularly for Civil-Military Operations (CMO) initiatives. Regular performance evaluations ensure that intelligence operations remain current and actionable, improving coordination, validation efforts, and overall mission effectiveness.

Effectiveness in Planning, Resource Allocation, and Execution. The Philippine Army may continue to prioritize the integration of intelligence into strategic planning and execution, ensuring continuous improvement in adaptability and mission effectiveness. Strengthening inter-unit feedback and enhancing coordination across divisions will further improve operational responsiveness and intelligence utilization.

Resource Constraints and Operational Risks. The Philippine Army may address resource constraints by prioritizing investment in intelligence infrastructure, training, and advanced tools for data collection and analysis. Allocating sufficient resources for personnel training and equipping the units with updated technologies will enhance the accuracy and responsiveness of intelligence operations, mitigating the risks posed by current limitations.

Proposed Strategies for Improvement: To address these weaknesses, the following strategies are proposed:

- Philippine Army. The Army may prioritize intelligence infrastructure resource allocation and specialized training to fill talent gaps. Improved feedback mechanisms and enhanced inter-unit collaboration may strengthen intelligence cycles, mission alignment, and operational responsiveness.
- National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA). NICA can enhance intelligence operations coordination by adopting real-time data-sharing regulations with the Army and other military divisions. Joint training efforts will foster greater understanding and cooperation, improving national intelligence capabilities and readiness to tackle security challenges.
- Department of National Defense (DND). The DND may allocate increased budgets for data analytics, cyber intelligence, and geospatial intelligence, enabling the Army to act on real-time data more accurately and swiftly. Furthermore, DND may focus on developing intelligence growth and training strategies to ensure the Army is prepared for complex threats.
- Foreign Intelligence Agencies. International intelligence cooperation is essential for addressing global security challenges. By sharing threat data and organizing joint training exercises, foreign intelligence agencies can help the Philippines improve its intelligence readiness, flexibility, and responsiveness to issues like terrorism, cybercrime, and regional instability.
- Academic Institutions. Collaborations with academic institutions can further develop intelligence professionals by conducting research on intelligence methodologies and cybersecurity. Partnerships with the Army for internships, applied research, and capstone projects may provide students with real-world experience, while offering the Army fresh insights and innovative solutions.

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